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The economic challenges countries face when adopting personalized medicine technologies pro-
vide an important illustration of many of the concepts articulated by János Kornai in his pioneering 
research on innovation in market-driven, capitalist surplus economies. In Chinese philosophy, Yin 
and Yang often represent contradictory yet inseparable opposites – two forces that not merely co-
exist, but are synergistic and mutually dependent. This concept is an apt analogy for the relationship 
between innovation and shortage in the health sector. Dangers arise from over-emphasizing the Yin 
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INTRODUCTION
The economic challenges countries face when adopting (or failing to adopt) per-
sonalized medicine technologies provide an important illustration of many of the 
concepts articulated by János Kornai in his pioneering research on innovation 
and surplus economies. This paper makes the case that in the 21st century, surplus 
economies will increasingly face the challenge of innovating to address “shortage 
within surplus” in a vital sector of the economy – that of health and medical care. 
This sector is growing as a share of the economy in virtually all countries, and 
the dilemmas of balancing innovation for longevity with solidarity in distribu-
tion will be exacerbated by genomic and proteomic “precision and personalized 
medicine” (PPM) breakthroughs. The narrative draws from my joint work with 
Kornai on choice and solidarity in the health sector (Kornai – Eggleston 2001; 
Kornai 2013; Eggleston 2016). 
In Chinese philosophy, Yin and Yang often represent contradictory yet insepa-
rable opposites – two forces that not merely co-exist, but are synergistic and 
mutually dependent. This concept is an apt analogy for the relationship between 
innovation and shortage in the health sector.1
For those focused on the macroeconomics of comparative economic systems 
and Kornai’s contributions regarding shortage versus surplus economies (e.g., Xu 
2017), this paper makes the case that the health sector provides a microcosm that 
perpetuates within a surplus economy the many features of a shortage economy, 
with close approximations of the many phenomena of chronic shortage he has 
analyzed: non-price coordination mechanisms, queuing, forced substitution, high 
employment even during recessions, high prevalence of government and not-for-
profit ownership, and difficulty in assessing and rewarding efficiency, produc-
tivity, and value-added from a societal perspective, to name but a few. Perhaps 
ironically, given the value of health and longevity, the experience of shortage is 
not vanquished by the dominance of capitalism in almost all corners of the globe. 
Kornai’s insights about the mechanisms and coping strategies under shortage will 
remain relevant indefinitely in our economic future, for understanding how in-
novation and shortage interact in the health sector. 
For my fellow health economists, this paper introduces and makes the case for 
the relevance of Kornai’s writings for understanding comparative health systems 
– subsectors within capitalist economies that manifest the phenomena of short-
age. While we health economists often attribute these characteristics of shortage 
1  Yin and Yang are an especially apt analogy for innovation and shortage for a health economist 
who first read Kornai’s works in Mandarin while studying in China to understand the econom-
ics of transition. 
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solely to their microeconomic roots and assume they are divorced from the field 
of comparative economic systems, our understanding can actually be enriched by 
a comparative economic systems perspective.2 
The paper first discusses the concepts of innovation and shortage, underscoring 
Kornai’s important research in these two spheres, and then turns to their interaction 
in the health sector. Specific examples from personalized medicine represent the 
leitmotif of this theme that innovation and shortage are and will continue to be in-
extricably intertwined in health systems of low- and high-income countries alike. 
INNOVATION AND SHORTAGE 
Innovation and its determinants form the centerpiece of Dynamism, Rivalry, and 
the Surplus Economy by János Kornai, a significant contribution to our under-
standing of the two great economic systems, socialism and capitalism. While the 
book focuses on capitalism, arguably its primary contribution lies in the emphasis 
on those vital aspects of capitalism that only juxtaposition with socialism can 
fully bring to light: innovation and surplus. He argues compellingly that innova-
tion is one of the great virtues of capitalism, through Schumpeterian “creative 
destruction”, and that socialism is incapable of producing sustained innovation in 
any sector of the economy, as illustrated by all the great innovations of the past 
100 years taking place in capitalist systems. He also makes thought-provoking 
and apt references to evolutionary biology and behavioral economics, topics not 
often associated with comparative economic systems and economic history. 
Kornai (2013) argues that only capitalism can continually sustain a surplus 
economy encompassing the whole economy, noting several exceptions “that 
prove the rule” such as military technology for socialist regimes’ survival, or the 
rationing of healthcare within otherwise surplus economies. It is the latter topic, 
which he and I have collaboratively researched previously, that this essay explores 
in greater detail. I argue that this island of shortage within surplus will grow not 
only in terms of the share of the economy (and thus the opportunity costs of the 
resources it absorbs), but also in the social salience of dilemmas in balancing in-
novation with access in the era of precision health and personalized therapies.
2  Moreover, this similarity of health sectors with shortage economies, unless carefully under-
stood for its linkage to surplus and innovation, might exacerbate the tendency of some – es-
pecially in the US – to decry “socialized medicine”. To the contrary, organized financing with 
embedded income solidarity and risk solidarity is integral to enabling our society to sustain a 
stream of health technology innovations that improve our well-being and longevity.
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 Shortage characterizes centrally-planned economies. Lack of innovation is 
both the cause and result of this phenomenon of socialism systems: “The shortage 
economy, one of the strongest system-specific properties of socialism, paralyzes 
the forceful engine of innovation, the incentive to fight for the favors of the cus-
tomer. … The producer/seller is not compelled to attract the buyer by offering him 
a new and better product [or service], since the latter is happy to get anything…, 
even an obsolete and poor-quality product [or service]” (Kornai 2013: 15).
However, shortage can appear in specific sub-sectors of capitalist economies 
as well; indeed, “phenomena of shortage appear universally in the allocation and 
utilization of free or almost-free public services” (Kornai 2013: 125). Health 
economists will recognize the concept of moral hazard, how health systems cope 
with the imbalance of supply and demand, and the “dynamic moral hazard” from 
insurance coverage that spurs innovations. 
To the extent that shortage is inextricably linked to the social impulse to pro-
vide equitable access and solidarity in life chances, this phenomenon has its bright 
side. As emphasized in the literature on the origins of inequality, opportunities for 
education and self-fulfillment depend on a child’s luck of birth in a poor or rich 
country (Deaton 2013); and those born into socialist regimes during the 20th cen-
tury usually benefited from the enhanced access to basic health technologies that 
such systems promoted:
“The socialist state’s paternalist pricing policy and financing of the welfare sec-
tors exert equalizing effects, which ultimately involve a redistribution of incomes. 
Practically everybody is entitled in a shortage economy to free public education 
and free health care, including poorer strata that would not be able to pay their cost 
in a ‘pure’ market economy” (Kornai 2013: 112).
Indeed, East Germany’s life expectancy at the lowest quintile exceeded that of 
West Germany for much of its existence; and China’s largest increases in life ex-
pectancy occurred under the Mao-era socialist system, from what might be called 
innovation born of necessity: promoting primary care through barefoot doctors 
and emphasizing low-cost population health measures as well as basic education 
(Babiarz et al. 2015).
Numerous measures that substantially enhanced the length and quality of life 
in otherwise especially resource-constrained economies included population 
health campaigns and addressing basic social determinants of health for the vul-
nerable segments of the population such as sanitation, clean water, decent hous-
ing, widespread immunization, employment, and food security, as well as access 
to basic health services and medications such as antibiotics. In some instances, 
technological breakthroughs also took place under socialism. For example, ar-
temisinin combination therapy is the standard combination therapy for one of 
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the worst global killers, malaria, and derives from a traditional Chinese medicine 
treatment. Artemisinin (???, Qinghaosu) treatment for malaria was discov-
ered (1972) and manufactured (1979) as part of a military project initiated under 
Mao Zedong’s government (project 523) in China; in 2009, it was approved by 
the US Food and Drug Administration and earned discoverer Youyou Tu first 
the prestigious Lasker-DeBakey Clinical Medical Research Award, and then the 
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine in 2015.
However, as will be discussed below, this example may be the exception that 
proves the rule that Kornai argued, the lack of a socio-economic context for break-
through technological innovations and their marketization in economies charac-
terized by general shortage. It is also important to acknowledge the limits to our 
knowledge about how best to promote institutional innovation. Necessity may be 
the mother of invention, but invention does not always spring to life whenever it 
appears to be a necessity, as the premature mortality throughout the low-income 
world attests. Moreover, the institutional innovation that socialist countries were 
adept at promoting – low-cost population health measures relying on individu-
als to comply with centralized orders – do not appear to be the most salient for 
breakthroughs in health in the 21st century. Societies are still struggling with how 
best to promote individual healthy behavior, and post-socialist economies have 
not been any more effective than traditionally capitalist ones – indeed, in many 
cases considerably less successful – e.g., in convincing individuals to quit smok-
ing, stop excessive drinking, eat healthily, and avoid sedentary lifestyles that lead 
to premature mortality. Moreover, while substantial health gains could follow 
from such simple measures as consistent use of seatbelts and bicycle/motorcycle 
helmets,3 the technological innovations extending life in the 21st century may 
derive more from personalized therapies for cancer and cardiovascular disease, 
rather than low-cost public health measures pioneered in shortage economies.
INNOVATION AND SHORTAGE: YIN AND YANG IN THE HEALTH SECTOR
The health sector is everywhere shaped by the dynamic interaction of innovation 
and shortage, while dealing with numerous market failures in healthcare financ-
ing and delivery (Arrow 1963). The seemingly inexorable increases in healthcare 
spending are driven by innovations: “The rate of health care spending growth can-
not exceed income growth indefinitely … eventually we will need to develop a 
3  Ironically, a physician in China is more likely to wear a helmet while working in a hospital 
than while biking, given the toxic doctor-patient relations that have resulted in violent attacks 
on healthcare workers.
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financing system that is sustainable in the long run. Such a system will inherently 
alter the process by which new innovation moves into medical practice” (Chernew 
– Newhouse 2012: 37). Precision health technologies, given their often steep prices, 
presage exacerbation of this challenge of ballooning health system expenditures.
The health sector also underscores the moral challenges presented by innova-
tion and shortage. One of the cruelest manifestations of shortage is the allocation 
of life-saving technologies only to those who can afford them – and providing 
economic incentive for innovation focusing on diseases that afflict the rich exclu-
sively, or more than, the poor (Eggleston 2016). The starting point in Kornai and 
Eggleston (2001) is the ethical challenge of promoting individual sovereignty and 
choice on the one hand, while assuring social solidarity, i.e., helping the suffer-
ing, the troubled, and the disadvantaged on the other. These two ethical principles 
have their counterparts in the phenomena of innovation and shortage (or access): 
can a health system sustain both choices (i.e., allowing the wealthy to purchase 
health improvements, not just flat-screen TVs) and solidarity to provide access 
to those same health improvements for those less fortunate, or at least for what is 
considered “basic” healthcare? Deaton (2003, 2013) emphasizes a similar point: 
innovations, first in population health and later in medical care, raised inequal-
ity but also brought progress with “trickle down” access for the poor. Certainly, 
a child born today in the poorest country on earth still has a higher potential to 
live a long healthy life than the richest individuals born over a century ago. This 
is true because science, population health, and economic development, even if 
uneven, have expanded the possibilities for all; social policies determine how 
soon and how completely those same possibilities for healthy longevity are made 
available to those less fortunate.
The mechanism underlying the “island of shortage” in the health sector bears 
many similarities to the classic shortage economy symptoms that Kornai has so 
eloquently and thoroughly dissected. 
“Most of the economic environment operates as a surplus economy, with all its 
usual side effects, but, in the sea of surplus, an island that bears the marks of a 
shortage economy can be seen. The doctor’s office is crowded and you may have to 
wait for hours. The waiting lists for surgery or diagnostic procedure may be months 
long (Kornai 2013: Table 7.1). Patients’ freedom is severely restricted in choosing 
a doctor or a hospital. In fact there are health-care systems that deny patients such 
freedom entirely, so that they have to accept the assigned doctor or health institu-
tion. The concept of forced substitution can also apply in medical care, where pa-
tients may not obtain the medicine, treatment, or physician they would choose and 
have to take what they are allocated” (Kornai 2013: 125).
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Such forced substitution may become ever more acute as some patients enjoy 
access to expensive new personalized medical therapies, while others must make 
do with older standards of care that eventually will not even qualify as “basic”.
But the shortage that drives the healthcare spending conundrum differs from 
the generalized shortage under a centrally planned economy. Its effects are simi-
lar, but its causes are distinct. Socialist shortage arises without, and indeed stifles, 
innovation; health sector shortage arises because of innovation. 
Innovation and shortage are causally and inextricably intertwined in the health 
sector, representing a Yin and Yang cycle: shortage spurs innovation, innovation 
breeds shortage, which in turn already provides the seeds of new innovations. 
Whether ultimately this is a virtuous or vicious cycle depends on the wisdom of 
policy choices.
To be more specific, the high price of new therapies and devices exacerbates 
shortage, but can also serve to prod the same or other innovators to search for 
lower-cost ways of producing and delivering the innovations, as well as pressure 
for policy innovations to support access. Egalitarian distribution blunts incentives 
for innovation by reducing the rewards innovators can charge high willingness-
to-pay consumers; however, the commitment to egalitarian distribution in the 
health sector also encourages innovation because it (1) reassures innovating firms 
that their products will have a ready market (eventually), rather than be perma-
nently relegated to the niche market of only the richest population; and (2) spurs 
cost-reducing innovations in new technologies. One fascinating example of the 
latter is the foldable microscope invented by Prakash and colleagues at Stanford, 
an extremely low-cost technology for accurate diagnosis in even the most re-
mote and resource-constrained parts of the world.4 Many other examples could 
be cited. Such solidarity-inspired innovation – to reduce costs and support broad 
access – alleviates shortage, but may also blunt incentives for future innovations, 
depending on policy design.
Thus, the shortage manifest within health systems, particularly in high-income 
capitalist economies but throughout the world to greater or lesser extent, is itself 
a product of surplus. It is only because the economy – in the same country or 
elsewhere on the globe – is constantly producing breakthrough technologies for 
health and medical care that the health policymakers in a given country continu-
ally face a dilemma regarding financing access to those innovations. This stream 
of new health technologies prompts governments to create agencies to evaluate 
their costs and benefits, a topic we turn to next.
4 See his TED talk at https://www.ted.com/talks/manu_prakash_a_50_cent_microscope_that_
folds_like_origami or read about the technology in Cybulski et al. (2014).
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EVALUATING INNOVATIONS AND MITIGATING SHORTAGE: 
HEALTH TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT AGENCIES
Given the Yin and Yang of innovation and shortage in the health sector, formal 
institutions for weighing the benefits and costs of new health interventions and 
medical technologies have emerged in both low- and high-income countries over 
the past two decades. Starting with some initial studies and policy decisions in 
the US, other countries have pioneered in the use of cost-effectiveness for health 
system decision-making. Most prominent is the UK, with its NICE (now National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence) established in 1999. Australia instituted 
health economic assessment for pharmaceuticals even earlier. Canadian law ar-
ticulates “resources stewardship” as a principle guiding the health system, and 
government agencies and/or formal requirements for health technology assess-
ment with cost-effectiveness analyses have been established in Sweden (2002), 
Germany (2004), France (2005), Netherlands (2005), Poland (2005 Agency for 
Polish Technology Assessment), South Korea (2006), and in multiple countries in 
other regions (Gulácsi et al. 2012; Neumann et al. 2017). Although the embrace 
of health technology assessment in the new member states of Europe lagged be-
hind what many expected in the early years of the transition, Poland and Hungary 
have been relative early-movers with health technology assessment in Central 
and Eastern Europe (Gulácsi et al. 2012) and systems there continue to evolve in 
dealing with significant resource constraints. In Japan, the government decided 
in 2014 to launch a pilot program for health technology assessment, and by 2017 
several pharmaceuticals had been reviewed in this cost-effectiveness appraisal 
process, including two target therapies, Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) for hepatitis C and 
Opdivo (nivolumab) for metastatic non-small cell lung cancer; the expanded as-
sessment program aims to re-price several drugs in 2018 as well as to establish a 
new government organization for the review of manufacturers’ data (Asano 2017; 
Asia Pacific Observatory Japan HiT 2017). Moreover, prominent organizations 
in global health, both public and private, have embraced the need for systematic 
presentation of costs as one input to decision-making for health, as evidenced by 
the initiatives of the World Health Organization and the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation (Neumann et al. 2017).
The trend has not been uniformly towards greater acceptance of such institu-
tions. In the US, the Office of Technology Assessment, established in 1972, was 
abolished by Congress in 1995, just when health technology assessment agencies 
were being launched in other countries (e.g., Australia adopted pharmacoeco-
nomic guidelines for pharmaceutical benefits coverage in 1993; the Canadian 
Coordinating Office for Health Technology Assessment published its first guide-
lines in 1994; and the World Health Organization established a project for guid-
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ing resource allocation considering costs in 1998). In fact, the 2010 Affordable 
Care Act in the US proscribes use of cost-effectiveness thresholds. 
Political and legal controversies have arisen regarding explicit cost criteria in 
health coverage decisions in other countries besides the US. In Germany, a 2005 
court ruling requires the government to reimburse for medical treatment if there 
is no alternative and the disease is life-threatening (Neumann et al. 2017:12).
Interestingly, the explicit consideration of costs has been less controversial and 
more widespread for preventive services and health and occupational safety regu-
lation, compared to curative medical therapies. This tendency might not appear 
surprising in the light of the differences people perceive in allocating resources for 
saving “statistical lives” versus identified lives (individuals with names facing life-
or-death choices). Even in the US, where the explicit use of cost-effectiveness for 
medical coverage decisions has been anathema, official agencies used cost-effec-
tiveness analysis in several cases: the 1980 decision for Medicare to cover pneu-
mococcal vaccination; the 1996 Center for Disease Control Community Preven-
tive Services Task Force Guide; and the 2003 Office of Management and Budget 
requirements for new health and safety regulations (Neumann et al. 2017). 
Among medical technologies, the most common and earliest applications have 
been for pharmaceuticals, as pioneered by Australia a quarter century ago. When 
a society refuses to use explicit cost-effectiveness analyses, such as in the US for 
most beneficiaries of public or private insurance coverage, then the function of 
allocating access falls to price: what co-payments insured patients must pay, or 
the full prices set for therapies not covered by insurance at all. Pharmaceutical 
pricing illustrates this dilemma of promoting access (favoring a low, marginal-
cost price) versus incentives for innovation (favoring a higher, above-average-
cost price). Without past innovation, there can be no current access; and pricing 
for current innovators will determine what access is possible in the future. No 
pricing policy can achieve both the dynamic efficiency of covering joint sunk 
costs of research and development and some return on investment, while simul-
taneously promoting broad access (static efficiency) with prices not much higher 
than user-specific marginal costs of production. Some policies such as patent 
protection, generic promotion, and compulsory licensing try to balance the im-
peratives, mitigating the innovation-inspired shortage.
EXAMPLES FROM PRECISION AND PERSONALIZED MEDICINE (PPM)
Precision medicine has a range of definitions, but in general refers to tailoring in-
terventions or therapies to an individual’s characteristics as assessed by biomark-
ers, often genetic testing, that predict the individual’s response to a specific treat-
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ment. For example, a truly “personalized” treatment recently approved by the 
FDA in the US was a new gene therapy, CTL019 CAR-T cell therapy for B-cell 
acute lymphoblastic leukemia, developed by Novartis; but more generally, preci-
sion and personalized medicine (PPM) connotes the combination of a therapy 
with a companion diagnostic test to identify the individuals who would respond 
to the therapy (Berndt – Trusheim 2017). 
Personalized medicine dominates in the newest anti-cancer treatments. It is no 
coincidence that some of the more recent countries or regions to adopt cost-ef-
fectiveness criteria in decision-making have focused on assessment of expensive 
therapies for cancer, such as Japan’s pilot program. New precision medicine tech-
nologies such as genomic diagnostic tests and targeted therapies often promise 
great clinical benefits – substantial gains in survival or even “cures.” However, 
they almost always are extremely expensive. The high price tag raises controver-
sy. For example, Sovaldi (sofosbuvir) for hepatitis C launched in 2013 at a price 
of $84,000 per patient, and Harvoni for $94,500, garnering much criticism de-
spite the argument that these cures saved money from liver transplants and other 
expenses for patients with the disease. The innovators soon lost market share to 
a competing innovator (AbbVie) offering a course of treatment at substantially 
lower cost, leading to a new “Bertrand competition” on price (Berndt – Trusheim 
2017). This case illustrates both cost-reducing innovation and the risks that in-
novators face in developing and pricing their products. 
The expenditures on target therapies can be quite formidable. In Japan, for 
example, expenditure of ¥180,000 ($1636) per month is typical for patients who 
take one Gefitinib a day for lung cancer, and ¥300,000 ($2688) a month for pa-
tients taking Gleevec for gastrointestinal stromal tumor (Asano 2017: Table 3). 
Since Japan has a generous stop-loss policy as part of its universal health cover-
age, it is taxpayers and government budgets, and not patients, who bear the brunt 
of these costs. Nevertheless, providing solidarity with inclusive coverage of such 
expensive therapies represents a nontrivial fiscal commitment. 
In the face of targeted therapies of significant cost, cost-effectiveness evalua-
tions prior to coverage decisions are bound to expand in many countries. Cover-
age of life-saving therapies may continue to be given priority over preventive 
services, even if the latter may in the end prove to be more cost-effective. In other 
words, in the arena of preventive services, cost-effectiveness criteria are routinely 
used to limit the budgetary expense associated with new interventions, including 
potentially expensive genomic testing. For example, Japan’s social health insur-
ance program does not cover BRCA1/2 genetic testing for breast cancer (Asano 
2017), although genetic testing of tumors and target therapy for breast cancer are 
routinely covered.
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Patients in Central and Eastern Europe have experienced barriers to access to 
precision medicine innovations compared to other Europeans, for a variety of 
budgetary and institutional reasons. A 2016 survey revealed that many patients in 
lower-income countries of Europe cannot afford anticancer treatments, especially 
innovative drugs for melanoma, renal cell cancer, and colorectal cancer (Mayor 
2016).
One of the earliest and most well-known examples of PPM is Herceptin (tras-
tuzumab) for breast cancer. This breakthrough treatment for human epidermal 
growth factor receptor type 2 (HER2)-positive breast cancer – first for metastatic 
cancer, and later expanded to earlier stage HER2-positive breast cancer – has 
transformed prognosis for this disease. It uses approved companion diagnostic 
tests to identify those patients who will respond, including HER2 immunohisto-
chemistry tests and HER2 gene-amplification tests. 
Health systems vary in their adoption of this innovative, life-extending tech-
nology and its companion diagnostic tests. Herceptin was approved for medi-
cal use in the United States in 1998 and in Europe in 2000 (European Medi-
cines Agency 2017). Trastuzumab is now on the World Health Organization’s 
List of Essential Medicines, the most effective and safe medicines needed in a 
health system (World Health Organization 2015). According to some sources, 
the wholesale price in the developing world is between 1800 and 1955 USD per 
440 mg vial (Management Sciences for Health 2014), already well below prices 
in high-income countries, but out of the reach for the poorest. Even in Australia, 
a 2001 cost-effectiveness analysis led to rejection for coverage; the government 
created a separate “Herceptin Program” to provide access for breast cancer pa-
tients (Neumann et al. 2017: 12). 
Delay between approval and insurance reimbursement for trastuzumab for 
metastatic breast cancer ranged from 126 days in the Czech Republic to over 2000 
days in Hungary and Romania and over 10 years in Slovakia, compared to less 
than one week in Sweden, Finland, Germany, and the Netherlands (Wait 2016: 
Figure 2). Moreover, even when trastuzumab is covered, patients in Eastern Eu-
rope often have to pay fully out-of-pocket for other HER2-targeted drugs such as 
peruzumab (Mayor 2016). In Thailand, trastuzumab was approved in September 
2000, but originally only patients covered by the Civil Servants’ Medical Benefit 
Scheme had access to the medicine free of charge; patients covered by the Social 
Security Scheme and Universal Coverage had to pay out of pocket for trastuzu-
mab treatment (Ross-Degnan et al. 2015). The innovation of trastuzumab begets 
shortage; some patients do not have access.
However, this example also illustrates, as Deaton (2013) emphasizes, how the 
inequality arising from breakthrough technology often leads to later innovations 
to extend access. In the case of PPM, the development of biosimilars can help 
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to reduce the price and improve access to this technology. Roche/Genentech’s 
patents of Herceptin expired in 2014 in Europe, and in 2019 in the United States 
(Taylor 2017); in 2013, Roche/Genentech relinquished its patent right for the 
drug in India (NCK 2017). The first biosimilar version of the drug, developed 
by Biocon and Mylan, received market authorization in India in 2013, and two 
years later BIOCAD announced the first trastuzumab biosimilar approved by the 
Ministry of Health of the Russian Federation (Singhroy 2016). Many countries 
establish systems to try to mitigate shortage and provide access to those other-
wise unable to afford the treatment, such as Australia’s separate fund covering 
Herceptin, or Singapore’s inclusion of trastuzumab in its medication assistance 
program. 
Many other examples of PPM and its diffusion process could be given, in-
cluding Erbitux (cetuximab), which targets EGFR to treat metastatic colorectal 
cancer, and Gleevec (imatinib), which targets the cell-surface tyrosine kinase re-
ceptor c-kit in gastrointestinal stromal tumors (Hamburg – Collins 2010). For the 
latter, wholesale cost in the developing world is about 1386.49 to 19,162.50 USD 
a year (Frye 2015).
Shortage, for example as manifest by lack of access to life-extending immune-
oncology therapies, spurs cost-reducing innovations, not only in the technolo-
gies themselves (e.g., lower-cost diagnostic tests), but also innovations in the 
institutions created to monitor safety and access (e.g., regulatory approval and 
insurance coverage decisions). For example, regional groups coordinate eviden-
tiary standards to streamline approvals, and the European Medicines Agency has 
piloted adaptive licensing schemes (Wait 2016). Purchasers have set up stand-
alone funds for innovative therapies (e.g., Italy, UK) that subsidize patient access 
even while the drug is under review or if denied coverage. Others have innovated 
with value-based pricing, managed entry agreements, and risk-sharing schemes 
between purchasers and manufacturers. Since these process innovations have not 
yet themselves been rigorously evaluated for their cost-effectiveness (given the 
relatively high contracting costs of establishing, monitoring, and enforcing them), 
it remains unclear how far they will take us in alleviating the innovation-induced 
shortage of personalized therapies. 
Sometimes, approval and pricing criteria are not transparently based on any 
evaluation of benefits and costs, and the contracting discussions involve case-by-
case “price negotiations, discounts or different compensation (e.g., reimburse-
ment of new drugs and financing some other program or project in health care 
– device donations)”, as discussed by Čatić (2016: 14) for the case of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Institutions need to evolve to guide such negotiations towards social 
value and clearly delineate ethical and legal parameters to avoid conflicts of inter-
est in evaluation decisions while still promoting patient access to new therapies.
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Moreover, while many tend to think of the cost-effectiveness of a given therapy 
as an immutable characteristic, it is not (Berndt – Trusheim 2017). In fact, there is 
a strategic decision process of the innovator – the firm developing the therapy and 
deciding about its companion diagnostic test threshold – shaped by the “rules of 
the game” set by governments and/or purchasers. An additional important factor 
is the competitive environment, or what Kornai calls rivalry. The prices estab-
lished in high-income countries like Europe and Japan as a result of this strategic 
decision process then dictate access for patients in other markets such as Eastern 
Europe and other parts of Asia where there is a lower ability and willingness to 
pay for these treatments. 
Innovating firms can also contribute to solidarity-enhancing innovation by de-
signing patient access arrangements to make it possible for poorer patients to 
receive PPM therapies despite their high price. Actually, such access programs 
constitute a form of price discrimination – a seller charging different customers 
different prices for the same good or service. As such, access programs combine 
social responsibility with profit maximization. In the most common form of price 
discrimination, a seller differentiates or separates customers into different groups, 
setting a different price for each group based on certain characteristics such as 
their willingness and ability to pay, or price elasticity. More inelastic consum-
ers (e.g., the rich) can be charged a higher price than those in the more elastic 
sub-market (e.g., the poor), leading to more revenue than uniform pricing. The 
sub-markets must be kept separate to prevent arbitrage by enterprising consum-
ers and their agents (such as US patients buying online drugs at prices offered in 
poor countries); the separation can be enforced by time, physical distance, and/or 
nature of use. Of course, a prerequisite for price discrimination is that the seller 
possesses a monopoly or at least some market power to set prices. 
Pharmaceutical firms’ patient assistance programs illustrate how price dis-
crimination reduces shortage and enhances access for the poor. The firm can 
separate the low income patients eligible for the assistance program from the 
“average” patient covered by health insurance, charging the latter a price well 
above marginal cost. Firms may work closely with a neutral third party to iden-
tify which patients qualify for the access program. In practice, one way firms 
accomplish this “price” discrimination is not by stating a lower price (which 
would run the risk of becoming a low reference price that is then demanded by 
insurance companies and other patients), but rather by donating whole cycles 
of treatment after the patient has already purchased the initial treatment cycles. 
While this has the same effect as a price discount, no formal price adjustment is 
made; the patient buys at the regular price and then, to promote access and sales, 
the firm donates the rest. 
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CONCLUSION
The incorporation of personalized medicine into clinical practice represents a 
long-term trend that interacts with demographic changes to challenge current and 
future generations. Longer lives and higher proportions of older people may ex-
acerbate shortage, despite the tremendous product and service innovations that 
Kornai has emphasized spring from the dynamism of capitalism. The irony seems 
profound (Eggleston 2016): Is the good or service that we value most – health 
and longevity – ironically the one where we cannot enjoy the surplus economy 
of capitalism? Ultimately, the answer to this question depends on whether we 
can innovate with cost-reducing products and strategies as much as with cost-
increasing ones, and are resiliently persistent in our quest to balance choice with 
solidarity.
Cautious optimism could be warranted regarding the power of innovation to 
produce both “miracle drugs” and the new approaches to financing and payment 
that will spread their benefits more widely. Public and private sector stakehold-
ers have to work together to enhance access while avoiding conflicts of interest 
(e.g., bribing regulators to cover high-price therapies even if not cost-effective). 
Access initiatives in low-income countries and for other vulnerable groups rep-
resent an interesting case. Patient access programs by pharmaceutical firms actu-
ally exemplify price discrimination, and thus are fully compatible with for-profit 
incentives. But this fact need not deny the humanity of such initiatives or their 
social value, as long as a balanced approach is taken to safeguard and protect 
public health goals.
In the health sector, dangers arise from over-emphasizing the Yin of innova-
tion over the Yang of access, and vice versa. If we over-constrain innovation, 
we die needlessly early and forfeit quality of life that innovations might have 
enabled. If we do not distribute access to innovations equitably, we diminish our 
humanity, suffer backlashes from populism and distrust of science and expertise, 
and risk social instability, even violent conflict.5 Wisely navigating these danger-
ous shoals will determine whether or not our children and grandchildren have the 
opportunity to live healthy lives to 100 years of age.
5  Clearly, those who insist all healthcare is a “human right” do not usually mean they condone 
bankrupting taxpayers and eviscerating efforts to address the social determinants of health 
to provide access to any medical technology that provides a few extra hours of comfort; and 
those who want to reward innovation while insisting the poor and sick can wait for “trickle 
down benefits” cannot deny the ethical challenges of consigning to an early death those pa-
tients with rapidly progressing life-threatening conditions like cancer.
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